As I have discussed in previous posts, “AIs” can make mistakes. In fact, they do make mistakes, and their mistake-making patterns are such that where and how they will make mistakes is both uncertain and constantly changing.
Thus, in any scenario where you want to attempt to make “productive” use of “AI”, you must have a system in place for checking every result. Not checking some results; checking every result. If each result might have a consequence for you (and if it didn’t have a consequence, why bother automating it?) and you cannot predict in advance which kinds of results will need verification, then verification is always required.
The verification often ends up being just as expensive as doing the work in the first place, which means that if you want your usage of “AI” to be personally profitable, you have to find someone else to externalize the cost of verification onto. This person becomes your adversary, and, if you are successful, your “AI’s” victim.
The Ladder-Climber And Their Reverse-Centaur Rungs
One way that this constellation of facts can straightforwardly assemble themselves into a dystopian nightmare is the phenomenon, described by Cory Doctorow, of the reverse centaur. This is when your employer non-consensually turns you into the verification system. The “AI” does the fun part of initially performing the work, and then you do the boring part where you check if the robot is right and clean up its messes, even if everyone already knows that it would, in aggregate, be cheaper for you to do the work in the first place.
Reverse centaurs can be made from any automation, not only “AI” automation. I think that there is a reason that this term happens to have emerged in the “age of AI”, though, and not with earlier automation technologies (even those which were considerably more viscerally horrific). That reason is: the wrongness of “AI” output is not merely a technical feature that must be compensated for, it is a generalized externality.
As I mentioned above, if you are responsible for the entirety of the work, both extruding the “AI” output and checking it, it’s usually cheaper to have humans do the entirety of the work to begin with. When humans do the writing directly, we can check as we go, and thus verification doesn’t need to be as comprehensive.
When “AI” coding advocates say “code review is the bottleneck”, what they are observing is that the LLM is still rolling the dice for each PR, and a human is still necessary to verify that each of those rolls is a winner. But calling this process “code review” is a bit of a misnomer; it’s not really “code review” in the traditional sense, it’s human understanding.
Before the advent of “AI”, the human understanding was implicit in the process of writing the code in the first place1, and the code review was a way of diffusing and extending that understanding. Now that the code can be authored with no initial understanding taking place, that cost has not gone away, it has moved.
Human understanding was always the bottleneck.
However, this is taking a collaborative view of a software project, where satisfying the needs and solving the problems of your customers are the goals. We can see that “AI” is a bad tool to satisfy those goals, because all it’s doing is converting the first half of the work, that of understanding the code as you write it, to understanding the agent’s output as you read it.
What if, instead, we were to take the view that every software company is a Hobbesian nightmare, red in tooth and claw? In this view, the only goal of a software project is for the individual developers to make their promo cycles and get their bonuses. Given that there is only a certain amount of money to go around, this is a zero-sum game where each programmer wants to look more productive than their colleagues.
Pretty much every organization finds it easy to reward “productivity” as expressed by lines of code emitted easy to reward, but the benefits of doing thorough and thoughtful design, analysis, and code review very difficult to reward. In this world, an LLM is an invaluable tool for the sociopathic ladder-climber, particularly if your legacy organization is still structuring their workflows as if the person prompting the bot is “writing” the code, and then they get to foist off the act of “reviewing” the code onto someone else.
Here, the prompter effectively externalizes the cost of the LLM’s failures but internalizes any benefits. The prompter will vibe-code a big feature, so large that the assigned reviewer can’t possibly comprehend it all effectively. When this happens, the reviewer will, eventually, be pressured to approve it, even if they can try to spot a few problems along the way. The reviewer has their own work to get back to, after all, the obligation to review the prompter’s (read: the bot’s) code is a drain on their time that they are not going to get rewarded for.
If this feature is a big success, the prompter gets a promotion. If it causes a big issue, well, the reviewer must not have been careful enough.
This is why LLMs are “good for coding”, and also why their biggest promoters keep having outages.
The Generative Gish Galloper
Coding is the biggest “success story” of this type of adversarial communication, but it is by far not the only instance of such a thing. LLMs create a new form of leverage that can turn Brandonlini’s law from a linear advantage into an exponential one. If you are engaged in a political debate where you want to overwhelm the other side in nonsense, an LLM can generate bullshit faster than it is physically possible for a human being to type, let alone respond thoughtfully. There is an asymmetry to the utility of this weapon as well: only one side of the political spectrum wants to flood the zone and destroy trust in institutions and the concept of truth. There’s a good reason that the fascists love it.
Straightforward Spam and Fraud
This is kind of obvious, but LLMs can generate lightly-customized, plausible-looking text much more quickly than any human being. This facilitates their use in fraud, spam, and scams. In a spamming or fraudulent interaction, once again, the costs are externalized onto the victim: the recipient of a spam message has to do all the work of “checking” the LLM’s output. Spammers already expect very low hit rates from boilerplate, and if the LLM can increase those percentages from 1% to 5% the technology will pay for itself; they don’t need anything like reliable accuracy.
Customer “Support”
If you have any kind of commercial relationship with a company, I probably don’t even need to mention this: customer “support” bots are a misery. Everybody knows it at this point. But customer support is usually conceptualized by businesses as an adversarial interaction, because it is a cost center. They maintain internal metrics on time-to-resolution and try to optimize them. Implicitly, this creates a dynamic where the goal of the customer service agent’s job is not to solve your problem, but to emit noise that will cause you to think your problem is resolved, or to give up, as fast as possible. Unsurprisingly, LLMs can emit this noise faster than humans can, getting those customers off the phone. But those customers will remember those interactions, and the story outside the TTR metrics is horrible.
Similarly to the situation in software development, LLMs can look very good on paper for customer support, but mostly what they are doing is illuminating the problems with the industry’s existing metrics, by turning “winning the metrics battle against the customer” into a more obvious and immediate defeat for the company’s long term reputation.
“Education”
In 2026 it is sadly a fact of life that students cheat all the time using “AI”, and that this cheating is very successful, in that the teachers find it very hard to detect.
LLMs are great for cheating on schoolwork because the student is externalizing the work of the checking onto the teachers, who are often starting at a disadvantage to begin with, at least in the US.
My view is that this is happening because of a divergence in the way that students vs. teachers (or, more accurately, “the broader educational system”) view grading.
When a student is asked to write an essay, the teachers see the effort as both intrinsically worthwhile for the student, as well as useful as a pedagogical tool to evaluate and react to the student’s progress. The student, by contrast, sees a stumbling block designed to knock them off the path to success and into a permanent underclass. It is no wonder that the student sees “AI” as useful to their own goals and has no compunction about deploying it.
There is a bitter irony that the ability to understand the inherent value of actually writing the essay on their own is the sort of thing that students can really only learn by writing a bunch of essays. There’s no way that I can think of which makes the benefit legible as long as a shortcut is available.
The net effect here is a downward spiral, where the already-wobbling educational system is sustaining an attack that it doesn’t have the resources to recover from. The individual students’ attacks against their teachers and their schools’ grading systems might appear to momentarily succeed, but they will win the battle and lose the war.
Spamming “For Good”?
Usually when we talk about someone unilaterally choosing to enter into an adversarial relationship, that’s an “attack” and for good reasons we have a negative impression of the attacker. However, I would be remiss if I did not point out that there are some cases where the relationship was already adversarial; just because you’re the attacker doesn’t mean that you are evil.
For example we might imagine use-cases like automatically filing appeals for prior authorizations against health insurance. It’s relatively well-known at this point that the main way for-profit insurers maintain their margins is by denying claims right up to the line of the policies themselves being fraud, so using a spamming tool to fight them might be entirely justifiable2 in that case.
Similarly, using an LLM could be justified in a fight against a company refusing to honor a warranty. One could imagine using an LLM to immediately generate replies and escalations.
However, even in imagined cases like these, the underlying problem is that the insurers and the vendors already have a tremendous amount of structural power, so it is more likely that they will have the advantage in deploying a communications weapon like an LLM, as well as enacting policies to simply ignore any LLM-based communication that you might submit. Worse, if these strategies were to become widespread, they might provide an excuse to reject any communications by feeding them into an unreliable “LLM detector” and issuing an automated “computer says no” even to hand-written correspondence.
It is also worth stressing that these cases are imagined, as compared to the very real coworker-abuse, spam, scam, fraud, and disinformation campaigns being waged in real life today.
Therefore, while legitimate uses might exist, it’s hard to imagine that there’s anywhere they would be genuinely valuable and sustainable. In the best case “AI” will provide a temporary advantage for underdogs that will provoke an arms race which the resource-advantaged adversaries will win in the long run, in the worst case the arms race itself will cement permanent structural change that will make things worse.
“Search” By Stealing
Most of the adversarial utility of “AI” is on the “write” side, since write-amplification is more obviously aggressive than reading. But the “read” side of LLMs — summarization and question-answering — can be a form of attack as well.
To begin with, the act of reading
itself
is currently enormously destructive, but that’s arguably not a fundamental
aspect of this technology. They could set reasonable rate-limits and respect
things like robots.txt, as search engines have for decades now. They could
also refrain from committing criminal
levels
of copyright
infringement.
But, today, using “AI” tools does suborn this sort of out-of-control crawling.
More insidiously, consider the scenario described in this YouTube video. The LTT Bros decided to try Linux again, and in the course of so doing, they had problems. When trying to solve these problems, they were faced with a choice: they could consult Reddit, or they could ask an LLM. Asking an LLM would “gaslight the heck out of” them, but they still found it preferable, because they would at least get an answer without getting yelled at.
Initially this sounds great. But it also means that you want to extract knowledge from a community, while mechanically eliding any values or norms that the community may want to impart as part of offering that knowledge. As someone who spent many years in a community tech support role, this is worrying. Many requests for support are people asking how to do things that will momentarily solve a superficial problem but create a long-term reliability problem or even an immediate security risk, that the question-asker doesn’t want to hear about. Consider the question “I’m tired of entering my password so much, how do I make it so my laptop unlocks automatically”. An obsequious chatbot will helpfully tell you how to do this without pushback.
But, this is also a sort of ethically murky area. The Linux community is somewhat famously, for many years now, a toxic cesspool of general hostility, misogyny, etc. It is certainly a good thing that people can get access to this knowledge without subjecting themselves to abuse. But it also means that the people with the power and the privilege to change the community for the better can just quietly withdraw, rather than fixing the problems. It also means that the positive elements of culture cannot be transmitted, and the things that people will never learn about unknown unknowns.
In this case, the “adversarial” communication is with society. The thing that using an LLM for search lets you do is withdraw from society and avoid forming any personal connections. There are some personal connections which are painful and annoying, and so that can feel like a momentary balm. But the need to make connections in general is, like, the concept of society itself.
Who Am I Hurting?
LLMs are good at adversarial communication. They are so good at it, relative to their other benefits, that they will tend to make communications adversarial if you are not remaining vigilant about the possibility that it might do so. My request to you, dear reader, if you are going to use such tools, is to always ask yourself, “who might I be hurting, if I use an LLM for this?”
If you’re using an “AI”, who is its adversary? If you haven’t given it one yet, who might the “AI” turn into an adversary? Who might you overwhelm with an asymmetric amount of output, or, if you’re receiving information and not sending it, who are you taking that information from without consulting?
Figure out the answers to these questions and conduct yourself accordingly; the answer might be “yourself”.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to my patrons who are supporting my writing on this blog. If you like what you’ve read here and you’d like to read more of it, or you’d like to support my various open-source endeavors, you can support my work as a sponsor!
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One of the reasons that software developers tend to prefer greenfield development is that when you are given a blank page, you can project your own specific understanding onto it. You can structure the codebase in a way that works for your brain, down to the variable naming conventions and the module layouts. LLM-assisted development makes everything into instant brownfield work, which makes developers instantly miserable; even those who are excited about the technology will frequently complain about how it feels like their agency has been stolen and their joy in the work has been diminished. But I digress. ↩
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Modulo the massive amount of other externalities involved in using LLMs, of course, but I don’t have the time or energy to get into those here. ↩



